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ll'l THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
~.lEit:EDITH P.AGE, 
l~laintiff, Appellant and 
Respondent on Cross Appeal, 
vs. 
LTTAH HO~IE FIR~~ INSURANCE 
CO~IP r\NY, a Utah corporation, 
Defendant~ Respondent and 
Cross Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
9903 
STr-\..TE3IENT OF THE NATURE OF THE 
CASE 
This is an action by which plaintiff seeks to recover 
the actual cash value of a fourplex building totally 
destroyed by fire on or about the 11th day of February, 
1961 under two fire insurance policies issued by the 
defendant. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury and submitted on two 
special interrogatories. The lower court originally ren-
dered judgment for the defendant. Thereupon the lower 
court granted plaintiff a new trial pursuant to plaintiff's 
motion for new trial. Upon defendant's motion to re-
consider the court's order granting a new trial, the lower 
court in a memorandum decision granted a partial new 
trial pertaining to the second insurance contract and 
vacated the original order granting a new trial. From 
the judgment for the defendant, plaintiff appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment and a new 
trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Meredith Page, the plaintiff, has been engaged 
in the business of rental properties as well as an insur-
ance agent for Utah Home Fire Insurance Company, 
defendant, for a period of approximately thirty years. 
He worked through Heber J. Grant and Company, 
the general agent for defendant corporation. (R 104-
105). On or about the 31st day of December, 1958, 
plaintiff purchased a surplus air force officers' quarters 
loc~ted at._ the Salt ·L{lke Air Base from LaVell 'V eb-
ster, 'a professional moving man. (R 108). Said build-
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111g· was a fourplex consisting of 2~ rooms, excluding 
closets and bathrooms (R 116) and of about 4,670 
square feet. (Exhibits 3 and 4). Thereupon plaintiff 
went to the office of the general agent, Heber J. Grant 
and Cmnpany, for the purpose of obtaining fire insur-
ance on the building. (R 108). He talked to a certain 
Ove C. linkley, Secretary-Treasurer of Heber J. Grant 
aud Cmnpany, office manager and assistant manager 
of the general agent, (R 108, 281) and explained that 
he was going to move the building some 20 odd miles 
out to 14610 South State (across the street from the 
State Prison), fix it up as a rental unit of four apart-
Inents. He explained generally the condition of the 
building. (R 108-110). After a discussion as to the 
muount of insurance to place on the building, plaintiff 
applied for $20,000.00 with the statement that after 
he did smne more work on it he would take more insur-
ance. (R 108-110). 
l\Ir. lnkley had serious doubts as to whether insur-
ance could be written and said he would have to refer 
it to the underwriter for approval. (R 292-294). There-
upon a policy for $20,000.00 with extended coverage 
was issued to plaintiff. (Exhibit 1-P). 
Sometime in the Spring of 1959 the building was 
n1oved and placed on a foundation at 14610 South State. 
The building was closed in by replacing all broken 
windows, new doors where needed, locks replaced and 
installed, cuts in the building caused when moved were 
covered and some dan1aged walls were repaired, addi-
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tional width of eaves were being constructed, the build-
ing was painted and arrangements made with a plumber 
to connect the plumbing to the sewer and prospective 
tenants were interviewed. (R 117-120). 
On June 27, 1960, pursuant to a telephone call from 
plaintiff to Heber J. Grant and Company, another 
policy in the sum of $10,000.00 with extended coverage 
was issued to plaintiff. (Exhibit P-2) (R 110). 
Prior to the issuance of the second policy, defend-
ant paid a fire claim under the first policy to fire damage 
to an out building which burned. Defendant had sent 
an adjuster out to the property to adjust the claim. 
(R 110-112). 
During the period in which the building was being 
prepared for rental, the plaintiff had permitted a certain 
George Welshman without compensation to store cer-
tain items in the building such as a small light power 
plant without fuel tank or carburetor; saws, hand tools 
and carpenter tools used in construction of the building; 
a pillow slip; Christmas tree stand; a bundle of alumi-
num; a couple of car generators; a washing machine; 
kitchen table; dining room table; and some iron scraps. 
( R 266-271) . The said items were not in the area of the 
source of the fire. ( R 266) . 
On or about the lith day of February, 1961, said 
fourplex was totally destroyed by fire. 
1 Suit was filed to recover under the two insurance 
policies after failure of satisfactory adjustment. De-
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feudaut answered generally by denial and set up an 
a tl'irtnati,,e defense that cmnpany was not liable because 
of increased hazard because of materials stored in the 
building and non-occupancy. (R 1-11). 
DiseoYery procedure was used and demand for jury 
trial was filed by plaintiff. (R 12-15). A pretrial was 
held on the 6th day of ~'larch, 1962 and pretrial order 
1nade and issues framed as to the amount payable under 
pol1eies and whether or not the premises had been used 
in Yiolation of policies. Jury trial was set for April 25, 
1962. (R 16). 
On the 23rd day of lVIarch, 1962, defendant filed 
a n1otion for leave to amend pretrial order by adding the 
additional defense that policies were issued by fraudu-
lent representations of overvaluation of the building 
and 1..1se for which the building was to be used. ( R 17-
18). 
On the 30th day of March, 1962, over plaintiff's 
objections the pretrial order was amended to apparently 
coYEr defendant's requested issue of over valuation of 
the property. (R 19). 
Again at the opening of the trial the defendant 
again sought to enlarge the issues of the trial now to 
include n1isrepresentations as to the condition of the 
building at the time the insurance was written. This 
enlargen1ent was again vigorously objected to by plain-
tiff. (R 93-96). 
Each party had three agents testify as to actual 
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cash value of the buliding at the time of the fire as 
follows: 
Ronald Sylvestor, 
for plaintiff $38,430.00 (R 188-193) 
John W. New, 
for plaintiff $33,718.39 (R 202-222) 
Sam F. Soter, 
for plaintiff $27,804.24 (R 222-230) 
Alex Gray, 
for defendant $24,780.16 (R 274-283) 
Raymond S. Fletcher, 
for defendant $ 7,500.00 (R 308-334) 
Guy D. Alder, 
for defendant $ 7,500.00 (R 335-343) 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1. THE ISSUE OF FRAUD SHOULD 
NOT HAVE BECOME AN ISSUE OR A MAT-
TER OF DEFENSE. 
Fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the 
plaintiff was not a proper issue to be tried or submitted 
to the jury for the following reasons: 
1. The defense was not pleaded, nor included in 
any pretrial order and not timely raised. 
2. The defendant waived any defense and was 
.. estopped from raising said defense. 
3~ The issue served to confuse the jury, prejudice 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the jury and detracted the jury frmn concen-
trating on the only true issue of what was the 
actual cash value of building at the time of trial. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and modern 
court decisions ha ,.e stressed the need for fairness and 
complete discoYcry in the preparation and trial of cases 
so as to eliminate surprise and offer counsel an oppor-
tunity to prepare his case to meet framed issues. The 
including of a defense of fraudulent misrepresentation 
as to the condition of the fourplex at the beginning of 
the trial violated the rule of fairness, was a surprise and 
provided no means of preparation concerning the issue. 
Rule 8 (c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides "In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party 
shall set forth affinnatively ... fraud ... and any other 
111atter constituting an avoidance or affirmative de-
fense." The defendant's claim that plaintiff made fraud-
ulent misrepresentations of material facts in the pro-
curing of subject insurance policies has never been 
pleaded even after the conclusion of trial and at this 
stage of the proceedings. See also Rees v. Archibald~ 
6U (:.?d) :264, 311 P2d 788, where the Utah Supreme 
Court held that an affirmative defense must be pleaded 
and proved. 
The defendant did not ratse the issue even when 
he asked the court leave to amend the pretrial order. See 
defendant's motion (R 17) wherein he claimed a mis-
representation as to the purpose and use of buildings 
and the valuation of said building. The amended pre-
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trial order is a1nbiguous but apparently follows the 
same theory. During the trial the defendant offered no 
evidence to rebut plaintiff's testimony and evidence 
that the intended use of the building was for rental 
purposes. As to the over valuation issue, defense coun-
sel at beginning of the trial said, "I don't think the 
over valuation is particularly an issue in the case, Your 
Honor. The policy provides that the company will pay 
the actual cash value and that is the third issue in this 
case as I have set them out or it is one of the issues." 
(R 96). The defendant thereby abandoned the defense 
he asked to have inserted in the amended pretrial order 
and confirmed the position of plaintiff recited in the 
amended pretrial order. 
Mr. Appleman in 20 A, Appleman on Insurance 
Laws and Practice, 11978, concerning Subject ~latter 
of Insurance-Misrepresentations, says: 
"The burden is upon the insurer, relying upon 
a defense of misrepresentation or breach of war-
ranty, to plead and prove such defense. The 
same result follows where the insurer defends 
upon concealment of material matters or fraud 
in the procurement of the policy. It has thus been 
stated that the insurer must prove the represen-
tations made, their falsity, materiality, and re-
liance thereon by the insurer, plus in some cases, 
the fact that they were knowingly made by the 
insured with the intent to deceive." 
In reference to the waiver of the defense of fraud 
and estoppel, this writer will briefly refer the court to 
the record concerning certain undisputed facts testified 
10 
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to by defendant's own witnesses. See R 284 as to the 
fact that I-Ieber J. Grant and Company is a general 
agent for defendant cmnpany. See the cross examina-
tion of 1\'Ir. Inkley, the Secretary-Treasurer of Heber 
.T. (irant and Company (R 291-296) wherein he admits 
muong other things, that plaintiff came into the office 
and adYised him that he had purchased a surplus build-
ing at the Air Base and that he was going to move it, 
place it on a foundation and there were four large apart-
Inents and that he referred the matter to the underwriter. 
He said in part as follows: "There was still some ques-
tion in my mind as to whether the underwriter ought 
not pass on it. It was out of the ordinary, a building 
being moved and set up again on new property and I 
thought he should know these things before he O.K.'d 
the order." (R 294). See also the cross examination of 
Norman Everett, the fire insurance underwriter of 
Heber J. Grant and Company, as follows: (R 306). 
Q. \Vere you advised that this building was go-
ing to be moved from the air base out to about 
20 miles out to Draper? 
A. No. 
Q. If you had been advised of that what would 
you have done? 
A. \Ve would not have accepted the risk. 
Q. Let me put it this way, if you were advised 
that it was to be moved only, what informa-
tion do you people have to have before you 
leave the office and go out and investigate 
something that has to be insured, don't you 
investigate things that, are questionable? 
11 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. All right now, if you were advised that this 
building was vacant and sitting out on the 
air base for an apartment building and was 
to be moved out some 20 miles out to the Point 
of the Mountain and placed on a foundation, 
your testimony is that you would have re-
jected it at that instant? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. In other words, if you were given that much 
information, you then were put on notice that 
this may be a bad risk? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did Mr. Inkley make any recommendations 
to you or do you recall? 
A. No, I don't recall for sure on that about any 
recommendations. 
Q. As a matter of fact, if you were given any 
information at all that a building was to be 
moved from one location to another, what 
would your reaction be? 
A. Not to accept it. 
Q. Just with that information alone? 
A. Yes, sir. 
'Vith the above facts in 1nind, this writer now 
quotes at length from 16 Appleman_, 9103-General 
Agent or officer: 
"Following the definition of general agent 
previously adopted as one haYing power to issue 
a poliGy. for the insurer or to bind the insurer by 
12 
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his contract, it is the accepted rule that knowl-
edge acquired by such agents within the scope 
of their duties is the knowledge of the insurer. 
It has been otherwise stated that the knowledge 
of an officer or agent of the insurer, which is 
acquired within the scope of his duties of employ-
ment or agency as to facts material to the insur-
ance, is imputed to the insurer, in the absence of 
collusion between the insured and the agent. And 
this is true regardless of whether such informa-
tion is communicated to the insurer." 
"An insurance company is charged with the 
knowledge of a general agent issuing a policy 
relatiYe to the insurable condition of the properly 
insured .... " 
"Knowledge on the part of a general agent of 
facts rendering the policy voidable, or of a breach 
authorizing a forfeiture, is imputed to the com-
pany, for the purpose of effecting a waiver or 
an estoppel to rely upon such forfeiture." 
"Notice acquired by a departmental manager 
of the insurer's general agents regarding facts 
within the scope of his authority is imputable 
to the corporate insurer, though the manager was 
unauthorized to alter or waive any policy pro· 
cessed." 
Many cases are cited in support. This writer also 
quotes ~Ir. Couch at 7 Couch on Insurance 2d 35:252, 
Constructive Knowledge: 
"'Vhile knowledge of the true facts is essential 
to the existence of a waiver or a breach of a policy 
provision or the falsity of a statement of the 
insured, it is not necessary that the insurer had 
13 
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actual knowledge. It is sufficient if the circuin-
stances are such that the insurer should have 
known the actual facts because it had knowledge 
of such matters as would have put a reasonable 
man on inquiry, that is, that it had had construc-
tive knowledae. Thus knowledge which is suffi-
cient to lead ~a prudent person to inquire about 
the matter, when it could have been ascertained 
conveniently constitutes notice of whatever the 
inquiry would have disclosed and will be regarded 
as knowledge of the facts, and the insurer may 
not deliberately disregard the circumstances 
which put it on notice." 
And also 7 Couch on Insurance 2d 35:271: 
"'Vhere the insurer had knowledge of such 
facts as should have put it on inquiry and such 
inquiry would have disclosed the true facts, it is 
estopped to assert the falsity of the insured, 
statements when the latter were made in good 
faith." 
In substance, even if defendant had properly raised 
the defense of fraud or misrepresentation, said de-
fendant as a matter of law has waived its claimed 
defense or is estopped from making it an issue. The 
only conflict in testimony is between the two officers 
for the general agent as to what transpired between 
them. Over this the plaintiff had no control. As a matter 
of fact, the only testimony opposing Mr. Page's testi-
mony as to the condition of the building as recited in 
R 108-110 is the testimony of Mr. Inkley and Mr. 
Inkley's testimony is founded on bad memory. 
~n. of this testi~on~ based on r:p~nd repeat-
14 
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eel hypothetical questions served only to confuse the 
jury and detract it frorn the main issue involved as to 
the actual case value of the fourplex at the time of the 
fire. 
Point 2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IX 
IXSTRlTCTIOXS GI\TEN TO THE JlTRY. 
The plaintiff respectfully asserts that the trial court 
erred in its instructions to the jury in the following 
specific rna tters : 
I. Instruction lla, defining actual cash ntlue, is 
erroneous and the trial court should have given 
plaintiff's requested instruction No. 2, which is 
the correct definition. 
2. The trial court should have instructed the jury 
as to a general verdict as set forth in plaintiff's 
requested instruction No. 1 rather than by two 
interrogatories. 
3. The trial court erred in the giving of the second 
interrogatory. 
The definition of "actual cash value", as it applies 
to fire insurance policies, has not ever been decided by 
the Ctah Supreme Court to the knowledge of this 
writer and is therefore one to be decided. There is by 
no means any uniformity of definition in other juris-
dictions. Some courts have adopted the definition as 
set forth in plaintiff's requested instruction No. 2 as 
follows: 
15 
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"Actual cash value of the property at the time of 
the loss means the replacement cost of the building less 
items specifically excluded from coverage such as under-
ground pipes and foundation under the ground, less 
depreciation for wear and tear." 
Some courts have defined actual cash value as being 
synonymous with "market value" and have adopted a 
broad evidence rule permitting all evidence to be ad-
mitted in arriving at this definition. 
The trial court did neither in its definition of actual 
value in instruction No. lla. The instruction did not 
define what actual cash value meant, but substituted 
the broad evidence rule as a definition. The instruction 
as given gave no guidance to the jury as demonstrated 
by the jury returning to the court asking what was 
meant by actual cash value. (R 354). 
61 ALR 2d 725 et seq. sets forth an excellent dis-
cussion of the cases involving actual cash value of build-
ings. See also 6 Appleman 3823. 
Plaintiff urges the adoption of the rule set forth 
by our sister State of Idaho as to the definition of actual 
cash value as it pertains to buildings. See Boise Asln. 
of Credit Men v. U.S. Fire Insurance Company_, 256 
Pac. 523. On page 527 the court says: 
"The actual cash value of the property at the 
time of loss is not ordinarii v the same as the cost 
~f rep.lacing the ~roperty ~vith new property of 
hke k1nd or quality. As to a building, it is the 
cost of a new building of the same rna terial and 
dimensions of the one destroyed, less the amount 
16 
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the destroyed building had deteriorated by use 
-4 Cooley, Briefs on Insurance, p. 3082. On 
the other hand, the market value of a building 
cannot be used as a test in determining the 
amount of recovery for the destruction of a 
building for Yarious reasons. If there was no 
market value for the property, so it could not 
be sold, it would not have any value, and conse-
quently there would be no loss .... Again the 
tnarket value of some buildings (as for instance 
tenetnent houses) may be much greater than 
their actual cash value .... 4 Cooley, Briefs on 
Insurance, p. 3981; 'Vall v. Platt, 169 Mass. 
398; 48 N .E. 270; 3 Sutherland on Damages 
(4th Ed.) pp. 3042, 3043." 
'Vhat is used as definition for actual cash value can 
have a wide range of effects as to the compensation paid 
to the insured. An example of this is the variance of 
appraisals in this case. John New, one of plaintiff's 
experts, used replacement cost new, less depreciation 
for wear and tear, less items such as foundation and 
the like and arrived at an actual cash value at time of 
fire of $33,718.39. For depreciation he used the same 
depreciation tables as used in the insurance industry, 
to wit: Marshall \raluation Service. (Exhibit 14-P). 
On the other hand two of defendant's witnesses, Ray-
mond S. Fletcher and Guy D. Alder, used market value 
basis and arrived at $7,500.00. The latter two ap-
praisers' figures amounted to about $1.60 a square 
foot, which is hardly enough to compensate for a chicken 
coop. Under cross examination both Fletcher and Alder 
admitted they would place a different figure if the 
building had been located at Midvale or say Salt Lake 
17 
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City. They also admitted that if there were two houses 
side by side, of equal cost and square footage, they 
would arrive at different figures if the room arrange-
ments were different. (R 330-331, 342). 
The definition of actual cash value should be one 
that can be understood and one that justly and ade-
quately compensates the insured for his loss. 
The trial court should have submitted the entire 
case to the jury rather than by two special interroga-
tives so that plaintiff would have full benefit of de-
manded trial by jury. The case was not complicated 
requiring interrogatories and would have not required 
the court to make certain findings itself, which is con-
trary to the basic principles of a jury trial. 
The second special interrogatory submitted to the 
jury concerning failure to make a full and honest dis-
closure to defendant insurance company is vague, am-
biguous and made without definition and not worded 
to ecompass facts argued by defendant. The interroga-
tory submitted was as follows: 
"Did plaintiff Meredith Page knowingly fail to 
make a full and honest disclosure to defendant Fire 
Insurance Company of the material facts regarding the 
nature and intended use of the burned fourplex?" 
To which policy is the court directing the jury's 
attention, the first policy issued when the fourplex was 
at the air base, or the second policy concerning dis-
closures made at the time the building was situated at 
the location where it was at the time of the fire? 
18 
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The status of the building at these differeut ti1nes 
when the two policies were issued were entirely different. 
The special interrogatory appears to direct the jury's 
attention to whether or not a full and honest disclosure 
was tnade to defendant fire insurance company of the 
material facts regarding the underlying nature and 
intended use of the burned fourplex. The record clearly 
discloses there was no conflict of evidence that the nature 
and intended use of the fourplex was for rental pur-
poses. The special interrogatory did not ask of the jury 
any questions relative to a finding of fraud concerning 
scienter, reliance by defendant, and whether or not de-
fendant was damaged by failure of plaintiff to make 
a full disclosure. 
Point 3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
ITS JUDGMENT. 
The trial court clearly invaded the province of the 
jury by making its own findings of fact, contrary to the 
evidence, by forming an issue that was not properly 
before the court, to wit: fraud, and by rendering a 
judgment adverse to plaintiff. 
The trial court properly granted a new trial in the 
first instance and then erred by granting a partial new 
trial. 
CONCLUSION 
This has been a case where the defendant has had 
a field day shot gunning the plaintiff with one defense 
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after another up to and including the trial with the 
purpose of confusing the only real and true issue of 
the case-what was the actual cash value of the burned 
fourplex at the time of the fire? An issue of fraud has 
found its way into the trial after repeated objections 
by the plaintiff. The evidence even refutes that it is a 
good defense even if it were properly presented, in that 
defendant insurance company waived its defense and is 
estopped from raising it. The trial cou_rt erred in its 
instructions, confused the jury and then after discharg-
ing the jury began to make its own findings of fact 
and invaded the province of the jury. The trial court 
properly acted when it initially granted plaintiff a new 
trial. Both parties now have an excellent deposition and 
it makes good sense and is fair and just to send the 
matter back to be retried in its entirety. The new trial 
should, however, be on only one issue and that is actual 
cash value at the time of loss with a definition that is clear 
of meaning and will render just and adequate compen-
sation to the insured. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAHL AND SAGERS 
17 East Center Street 
Midvale, Utah 
Everett E. Dahl 
Victor G. Sagers 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, 
Appellant, and Cross 
Respondent 
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